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Abstract: 
Professional Service Firms (PSFs) are increasingly pressured to strategic 
changes by evolutions in their environments. Research has especially 
emphasized changing client behaviours and demands, globalization and 
increasing competition. However, the internal dynamics of strategic 
change in PSFs remain under-investigated. The current paper focuses 
specifically on the role of professional identities in processes of strategic 
change, as identity has emerged as a key variable for understanding PSFs 
in recent research. The current paper introduces an analytical framework 
in four steps for understanding strategic change implementation and the 
role of professional identities. These steps comprise: 1. The nature of the 
strategic change; 2. Changes in organisational processes and in 
professional roles; 3. Identity moves by the professionals; 4. The outcomes 
of the strategic change process. The framework is applied to three 
different  PSFs representing three typical strategic changes. Based on the 
analysis of the case studies we argue that the nexus of analyzing strategic 
change in PSFs lies in the intertwined processes of evolving organizational 
roles, practices and professional identities. The paper also spells out 
managerial implications for role design and effects for professionals in 
strategic changes.  
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1. Managing strategic change in PSFs: organizations and 
professional identities at stake  
Research agrees that PSFs (Professional Service Firms) are pressured to strategic 
changes by evolutions in their environments such as changing client behaviours and 
demands, globalization and competition (e.g. Brock, Powell, & Hinings, 1999; 
Empson, 2007; Galanter & Palay, 1991; Greenwood & Lachman, 1996). The strategic 
changes undertaken by PSFs’ in response to a changing environment have been 
studied from a number of different perspectives. From a strategic management 
perspective it has been pointed out that the underlying logic of doing business in 
professional services may be changing towards more commercialism (Cooper, 
Hinings, Greenwood, & Brown, 1996). Changes in the ownership structure – from 
partnerships to public ownership – have been observed and their consequences 
discussed (Empson & Chapman, 2006; Greenwood & Empson, 2003). PSFs’ efforts to 
become less dependent on individual knowledge workers and increase the efficiency 
of knowledge work by leveraging and reusing knowledge have been studied under 
the label of knowledge management (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 1999; Morris, 2001; 
Sarvary, 1999; Werr & Stjernberg, 2003). Furthermore, mergers and acquisitions, to a 
large extent taking place in a search for economies of scale and scope, have been 
studied (Empson, 2000, 2001, 2004).  
Taken together, these studies indicate that strategic changes in PSFs often meet 
considerable resistance from professionals. For example, knowledge management 
initiatives generally grapple with the challenge to actually make people use the 
systems (Brivot, 2007; Morris, 2001) and mergers and acquisitions run the risk of key 
professionals leaving the organization, jeopardizing their intended positive outcomes 
(Empson, 2001).  
This paper focuses on strategic changes in PSFs and aims at investigating them from 
within the professional service firm, following the call by Suddaby, Greenwood and 
Wilderom (2008). Building on recent works pointing out the importance of 
professional identity in understanding change in PSFs (Chreim, Williams, & Hinings, 
2007) and other industries (Lefebvre, Roos, & Sardas, 2009; Sardas, 2001; Dutton & 
Dukerich, 1991; Ellemers et al., 2004) we ask the question:  How does professional 
identity influence the implementation of strategic changes and what are the processes and the 
determinants driving the evolution of professional identities in situations of strategic change? 
The paper develops the argument that understanding strategic change in PSFs 
requires the analysis of the intertwined evolution of PSFs' organization and the 
structure of roles and the professional identities assumed by the professionals. The 
impact that organizational changes have are affected by professional roles and 
identities, which may work as both enablers and barriers to change. Strategic changes 
in PSFs and their organizational consequences provide “offers” of new roles and 
associated professional identities that professionals relate and contribute to in 
different processes of identity formation. This argument is developed in relation to 
three case-studies that represent typical but diverse situations of strategic change and 
associated organizational and identity evolutions: a merger between an IT and a 
management consulting firm; the acquisition of an independent technical consulting 
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firm by a large consultancy and the evolution of the organization of an independent 
mid-size consulting firm. We propose a framework of analysis for the cases which 
comprises four levels of analysis: the nature of the strategic change, the 
organizational consequences on processes and roles, the professional identity moves 
at the individual level, and the outcome of the process of change.  
The role of professional identities in strategic change in PSFs is a recent but 
promising area of research (Chreim et al., 2007). The current paper contributes to the 
literature on strategic change in PSFs by adding insights into the organizational and 
individual aspects of change. It also contributes to a growing literature on identity in 
PSFs by shedding more light on the processes by which professionals form and 
transform their individual professional identities in interaction with organizational 
practices.  
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, we propose an integrative 
framework for understanding strategic change from an identity perspective. This is 
based on a review of research on professional identity and on the consequences of 
strategic change on organizational practices in PSFs. In the following section, the 
methodology is discussed. In the third section, the framework is used to analyse 
three contrasted case-studies of strategic change in PSFs. Finally, in the discussion 
part, special attention is paid to the concrete process of strategic change at the 
different and intertwined levels of analysis proposed by the framework. We also 
discuss the consequences of our findings for the conception of professional identities 
and on the role of professionals in strategic change in PSFs.   
2. Professional identity, organisational roles and strategic 
change in PSFs: framing the challenges 
Identity is traditionally defined as giving the answer to the question: who am I? (e.g. 
Gioa, 1998), i.e. the definition of the self. Professional identity is associated with the 
attachment to a certain role and can hence be understood as “the relatively stable and 
enduring constellation of attributes, beliefs, values, motives, and experiences in 
terms of which people define themselves in a professional role” (Ibarra, 1999:764). In 
the current paper we view identity as a dynamic psychosocial phenomenon, which 
highlights the process through which individuals define and adapt themselves to 
professional roles during their careers in a social environment (Ibarra, 1999). This 
identity construction and adaptation is viewed as a transactional process of both 
identification and distinction inside a professional community (Kreiner, Hollensbe, & 
Sheep, 2006) which has far reaching consequences for organizational members’ 
behaviour, motivation, commitment, interaction, etc. (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton 
et al., 1994). The professional identity provides resources for action based on what 
are perceived suitable and desirable skills, beliefs and values (Weick, 1995).  
Professional identity is thus viewed as a construction resulting from what could be 
seen as a “transaction” between an individual dynamic and an organisational offer of 
roles to its members. It is a transaction in which the individual’s understanding of 
the self is matched with perceived important characteristics of the changing 
organizational role. In this process both the professional identity and the 
4 
 
organizational role may be subject to change and adaptation. However, the level of 
match achieved at any given time, as reflected in organizational members’ 
identification with the emerging role/organization is an important predictor of the 
reactions to organizational change (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Ellemers et al., 2004). 
Professional identity has been a category in the study of professional service work 
and firms for some time. Two main approaches can be identified according to their 
respective focus on the organization or on the individual. The first one builds on 
social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989, Dutton et al, 1994) and considers 
professional identities as a key control variable in PSFs (Alvesson, 2004; Kärreman, 
Sveningsson, & Alvesson, 2002). Given the complex nature of the task and the lack of 
formal control mechanisms, the professional worker’s understanding of him/herself 
in the role and task have been pointed at as central for guiding the behaviour of 
autonomous professionals through identification with the organization and its 
cultural system (Alvesson, 2001). Furthermore, the opportunity for the professionals 
to construct an attractive identity as part of a PSF has been pointed out as a way to 
foster loyalty and thus retain employees (Alvesson, 2000). However, the processes of 
how identification and control play out in specific organisational situations still 
remains underinvestigated.  
The second approach focuses more on micro-processes of professional identity 
formation with a psychosocial perspective. In this approach, professionals relate to 
organizational roles through different processes of identification, adaptation or 
rejection (Ibarra, 1999; Kreiner et al., 2006; Pratt et al., 2006). The process of 
professional identity formation and evolution is related to both “individual factors” 
(such as the personal demands for integration and/or for differentiation) and 
“situational factors” (such as the pressures of the collective) (Kreiner et al., 2006).  
The current paper integrates these two approaches to identity in a common frame 
aimed at grasping a variety of situations and actions. We view identity formation as 
taking place in a social setting with the organization “offering” (or “demanding”) 
professional identities which are then negotiated and enacted (more or less easily) by 
professionals.  
This view adds to the literature by focusing on the dynamic nature of professional 
identity and strategic and organizational conditions. The formation of individual 
identities has to a large extent been seen as taking place through organizational 
practices with work organization, activities and identity formation being closely 
interrelated (Chreim et al., 2007). For example specific rituals of recruiting and 
promoting professionals have been found to contribute to the construction of identity 
in PSFs (Alvesson & Robertson, 2006) as has the relationship between professionals 
and their clients (Grey, 1998). But in these studies, identity formation and transition 
are related to professional roles and organizational conditions which already exist 
(e.g. Ibarra, 1999) and it is assumed that professionals will either accept and adapt to, 
or reject these identity “offers”. With the exception of Chreim et al, (2007) strategic 
change, including the evolution of organizational processes, roles and professional 
identities has not been investigated.  
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A framework for studying strategic change and identity 
formation 
The current study aims at extending existing approaches to understanding identity 
in PSFs by highlighting the dynamic interactions between strategic changes, 
organizational practices and roles and professional identities, acknowledging the 
reciprocal relationship of the three perspectives. We propose to consider the 
understanding of strategic change in PSFs through a systematic analysis at four 
levels:  
1. The nature of the strategic change. Strategic change may be defined as a 
“difference in the form, quality, or state over time in an organization's 
alignment with its external environment” (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997, p49; 
Van de Ven & Poole 1995). The organization's alignment matches the 
resources and patterns of an organization with its objectives (Hofer & 
Schendel, 1978). Strategic change comprises both changes originated from 
inside the firm (eg. new objective, evolution of resources) and from its 
environment (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997). Strategic change should be 
considered relatively to its content, issue, and extent of change for a given 
PSF. For example, the introduction of commercial pressure may be a strategic 
change in a traditional professional organisation (e.g. Greenwood, Hinings & 
Brown, 1990) but less for other companies. The strategic significance of a 
change can hence be defined by the extent to which it is viewed as a reason for 
changed practices in the PSF’s organisation and daily work and/or subjective 
identities for members (e.g. From a traditional professional conception to a 
more profit-oriented one).   
2. The changes in the organisational practices and in the structure of roles 
offered to the professionals. The issue is here to consider a first step of 
implementation of the strategic change in the organization through the 
evolution of organizational processes and the offer of new or changed roles to 
professionals in the PSF. This step of analysis is focused on the formal design 
(structure and processes) of the organisation and the evolutions in the 
practices which are expected.  
The nature of organisational practices in PSFs has previously been discussed 
in the literature, but to a less extent in relation to strategic change and identity 
(e.g. Maister, 1982, 1993). PSFs are strongly influenced by the organisational 
practices related to career and promotion opportunities, project team 
structure, ownership and hierarchical structure, and type of client 
assignments. These practices support the professionals through providing 
resources for accomplishing their work with clients and with building and 
sharing knowledge. The nature of these organisational practices has been 
pointed out as a key success factor of PSFs and should also influence the 
possibility of change as well as be subject to it (Anand et al, 2007; Gardner et 
al, 2008). In this paper, we concentrate on strategic changes which have 
motivated subsequent changes in organizational practices and professional 
roles in the PSF. 
6 
 
3. The identity moves that are expected, possible and/or desired by the 
professionals. This level of analysis focuses on the concrete reactions and 
evolutions of the professionals in the PSF. Are the evolving organizational 
practices and the associated role offers sustainable for the professionals? Do 
the professionals have enough resources, cognitive and organizational, to 
evolve and assume the new roles? Are the new roles sufficiently attractive to 
be desired by the professionals? This suggests the analysis of the processes 
through which professionals develop renewed identities in relation to the 
offered roles, acknowledging that sustainable identities are necessary to reach 
a real strategic change. Hinings et al., (1991), for example, relate the failure of 
an intended change in an audit firm, to the lack of adherence by the 
professionals.  
In order for an identity to be perceived as attractive by professionals, Dutton 
et al. (1994) suggest that it needs to give them a sense of self-continuity, self, 
distinctiveness and self-enhancement. For the case of strategic change in PSFs 
this may imply that an identity offer needs to be perceived as matching the 
professionals’ sense of who they are (self-continuity) and hence be in line with 
professional norms and values. An attractive identity offer should also 
provide a distinct image of the group/organization in relation to other 
groups/organizations (self-distinctiveness) and support a positive image of 
the self (self-enhancement) by connecting to central values such as 
competence, power, efficacy, virtue, etc.  
In the context of professional services, it has further been shown that 
professional identity is formed in relation to institutionalized ideas of the role 
of the professional (Chreim et al., 2007). A strong idea on the institutional level 
is that professional service work is associated with personal accountability and 
autonomy (Empson et al., 2006). Current evolutions in the industry, however, 
challenge this for control and management reasons as well as for cognitive 
reasons. Changes in the organizational conditions supporting the 
professionals in PSFs may thus lead to roles and organizational settings which 
threaten the experience of self-continuity, self-distinctiveness and self-
enhancement and thus may be contested by professionals and affect the 
outcome of the change process. 
4. The outcomes of the strategic change. Here our objective is not to evaluate 
the process in a failure or success discourse, but to consider, both for the 
individuals and the organization, the results and the pending uncertainties for 
the PSF and its professionals in the long run. For example, the outcome of a 
strategic change can be the departure of a large part of experienced 
professionals while going along with an increase of turnover in the short run. 
Such an evaluation assumes that organizational change is not a simple top-
down process but a complex intertwined process of collective learning 
through which organisational members negotiate and construct the concrete 
organisation and its practices (Hatchuel, 2000; 2005; Sardas & Lefebvre, 2004).  
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These four levels of analysis offer a frame of reference for understanding strategic 
change in PSFs. Strategic changes in PSFs will most often change the identity offered 
to professionals and can thus only be implemented through a successful professional 
“identity transaction” (Dubar, 1991), or “identity work” (Kreiner et al., 2006), by 
which individual professionals’ expectations and the identities offered by 
organizational changes are aligned – which may imply changes in the strategic, 
organizational and identity dimensions. The processes by which this alignment is 
achieved or fails to be achieved are the focus of the current paper.  
3. Methodology 
Given the emerging status of the question of professional identities in strategic 
changes in PSFs we address the issue with an exploratory approach.  The above 
framework will be illustrated and elaborated on in relation to three cases of strategic 
change in PSFs. In each case, we study the processes of strategic change through the 
intertwined evolution of organizational processes and roles and professional identity 
moves. The cases offer a panel of typical strategic changes in PSFs’: a merger between 
two PSFs with complementing service businesses (Alpha); the takeover and 
integration of a mid-sized PSF by a large technical consulting firm (Beta); and the 
dramatic evolution of the internal organization of a mid-sized PSF (Gamma). By 
selecting multiple and contrasting cases representing differences in the nature of the 
strategic change, the changes in organizational practices, structures and roles, the 
professional identities moves, resistances and transactions and the outcomes, we aim 
at providing an empirical basis enabling theory development with sufficient 
generality to grasp the diversity of the phenomenon in focus (Eisenhart, 1989). The 
three studies are based on a mix of interviews with complementary devices of data 
gathering in order to grasp the processes at work (cf. Table 1). The data allowed us to 
compose case studies with sufficient details in the longitudinal analysis and in the 
different levels of analysis considered.  
Alpha was studied by the third author in a longitudinal case study between 2001 and 
2004. The focus of the study was the acquisition of the management consulting firm 
Alpha by the IT-consulting firm Theta in the year 1999. In order to enable a rich and 
multifaceted understanding of this particular case (Denzin & Lincoln 2000, Merriam 
1988) 32 semi-structured interviews were conducted with respondents at different 
hierarchical and vertical positions in both firms. The interviews were conducted in 
two bulks. 9 interviews were made in a pilot study in 2001 with the focus on the 
overall post-merger integration plans and processes. An in-depth study comprising 
23 interviews was conducted in 2004 focusing on understanding how the involved 
parties made sense of the merger when the merger and its course of events had 
settled. All interviews were recorded and transcribed in order to facilitate thorough 
analysis and a rich description.  
The acquisition of Beta and the consequential changes in roles and procedures, 
identity moves and results were studied retrospectively by the fourth author. Data 
was collected through interviews on both the management and the consultant level. 
Among the 12 interviewees were both consultants who had worked for the 
organization for many years and more recently employed ones. Interviews focused 
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on how the organization of the focused office had evolved following the acquisition, 
how organizational members had reacted to these changes and what the 
consequences of the changes were for current ways of working and relating to each 
other within the organizations’ 3 work teams. The interviews were conducted as part 
of an intervention research project aiming at understanding and improving the 
collaboration between consultants within the organizations’ 3 work teams that had 
been formed following the acquisition. Interviews lasted for 1-1,5 hours and were 
recorded and transcribed. Further information on the organization and its culture 
and practices was gained through observations of meetings and in workshops 
providing feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of the work groups’ ability to 
leverage its members’ competencies. Interview, observation and workshop 
transcripts were analyzed through thematic grouping of text segments in relation to 
the analytical framework. The analysis was supported by the software tool NVivo.  
Data for the Gamma case were derived from a collaborative research project (Shani et 
al, 2003; Hatchuel and David, 2007) conducted by the first and second authors1 
between 2005 and 2008. Central to collaborative research is that knowledge on the 
issues facing the firm are produced in collaboration with organizational members at 
the issue moment, which helps avoid post-rationalization in ex-post discourses. Data 
were triangulated: discourses in interviews were analysed with complementary 
sources (e.g. internal management documents, observations). Researchers also 
proposed analyses and action orientations to the firm which were critically discussed 
and offered a validation of data.  The collaborative research in the Gamma case 
started following a feeling of uneasiness about a number of challenges facing the 
organization. A first part of the work was to diagnose the causes of these 
organisational symptoms and to propose ways of dealing with identified issues. A 
second period of engagement was dedicated to the design and experimentation of 
solutions. In this paper, the description at the four different levels is provided from 
different parts of the overall collaborative research2.  
PSF Professional 
service 
Research 
period 
Strategic change Data gathering 
Alpha IT and 
management 
consulting 
2001-2004 M&A Interviews (32) in a 
longitudinal study 
Beta Engineering 
consulting 
2008-2009 Takeover Interviews (12) + 
observations and 
workshops 
Gamma Consulting to 
works’ councils  
2005-2008 Re-organization Collaborative research: 
mix of interviews (56),  
validation of analyses 
and co-development 
of solutions. 
Table 1. Research setting and methods 
                                                 
1 In association with a third one, Philippe Lefebvre. 
2 For a more comprehensive and detailed view (in French), see Gand (2008). 
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4. Three cases of strategic change and professional identity 
evolutions   
Vignette Alpha. A merger between IT and management consultants: the 
clash of organizations and associated professional identities 
Alpha was an independently operating management and strategy consulting unit in 
an international auditing firm operating in Sweden. Alpha was founded in 1995 and 
had in 1999 grown to one of Sweden’s top management consulting operations 
employing around 300 people.  
1. Nature of strategic change. Diversification through combining competence 
areas.  
For Alpha, the strategic change started in the midst of the IT-boom around the new 
millennium when Alpha was acquired by the international IT-consulting firm Theta 
with around 3000 employees. The IT-boom inspired the creation of “one stop shops” 
for consulting. The reasoning was that to stay competitive on the consulting market 
both management and IT consulting firms would need to diversify and offer services 
based on competence both in IT and management. The merger between Alpha and 
Theta would in this respect enable the IT-consultants to become more management 
and strategy-oriented and give the management consultants access to competence on 
IT. The hope was that the professional image of both the IT- and management 
consultants would be strengthened by being combined with each other. 
The new strategy meant that the management consultants in Alpha would need to 
interact and integrate with IT-consultants. They also were expected to share their 
knowledge and work methods as well as learn from the experiences of the IT-
consultants. How the integration of the two competence areas would be 
implemented more in detail was however not clear at the time of acquisition. With 
time however it became clear that the strategic change challenged the core logic of 
Alphas management consulting practices.   
2. Changes in organizational processes and roles. Integrating different 
practices.  
Before the acquisition, Alpha worked according to a business model common for 
larger management consulting companies. The organization was structured 
according to a traditional professional partnership with a pyramid consultant 
hierarchy in which the roles and responsibilities of junior and senior consultants and 
partners were clearly defined. As part of an up-or-out policy the performance of the 
consultants was regularly evaluated and the consultants were expected to follow a 
development plan, get promoted or, if not, leave the firm. The structure was 
designed to motivate the consultants to work hard to perform in client projects with 
the hope of climbing the career ladder and hence increase their responsibility, pay 
and status. The structure was also designed to support the consultants in developing 
their networks and relationships with clients. As part of the increased responsibility 
of promotion senior consultants were expected to engage in sales activities which 
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were conducted as an integrated activity in the overall consulting process. As a result 
there were no separate sales unit.  
The acquiring firm Theta was different in several aspects. It was a public company 
which had a more specialized organization dividing consultants into specialty areas. 
The organization was also more bureaucratic with more stringent routines and 
reporting and follow up systems. These were needed to reduce the risk in the often 
complex, long and costly IT-development and implementation projects Theta 
delivered to its clients.  A failure to deliver to specifications and on time could 
become very costly for Theta. In Theta the sales activities were also specialized in a 
separate sales unit.  
Thetas consulting practices and processes where, thus, quite different from those of 
Alpha. And in order to realize the potential of combining IT- and management 
consulting competences Alpha needed to adapt to the practices of Theta. Just the fact 
that Alpha had been acquired by a public company meant that they “lost” one of the 
main incentives for the consultants, the possibility to become a partner. Further, a 
common sales unit was established which would have the main responsibility for 
sustaining the relationship with clients and sell the organizations’ services. This 
contradicted Alphas logic where selling and delivering management consulting 
services were integrated. Integration between consultants would take place in 
individual client projects which meant that Alpha now needed to interact and 
coordinate with the IT-consultants in their daily consulting work. The integration of 
systems and routines were also discussed which led to a critique of Alphas 
seemingly harsh career system with its up-or-out policy and to demands that the 
wage level of IT- and management consultants would be equalized. These changes 
threatened to change the roles of the management consultants from that of 
independent consultants who prove themselves through their consulting 
performances and career moves to ordinary “dull” workers who contribute their 
small bit to a bigger machinery. In essence the management consultants were afraid 
of losing their image of exclusivity if they adapted to the changes.   
3. Identity moves. Threat to an elite identity. 
A hope before the merger was that both IT- and management consultants’ 
professional image would be strengthened. However, the management consultants 
from Alpha did not find the identity offer attached to the integration with IT-
consultants attractive. Instead the structural changes that followed the acquisition 
threatened to undermine the practices they found to be essential for carrying out the 
role of a good, competitive management consultant. They argued that the practice of 
management consulting needed to follow a logic that is quite different from that of 
IT-consulting and that these different practices were needed to support the 
professional identity (and image) of the management consultants. Some Alpha 
consultants went as far as to say that the management consulting business would be 
ruined if the changes where implemented in full.  
And it should differ because it’s different types of talents and it’s different types of business 
models. I mean that the management consulting organization must build on the traditional 
management pyramid: a lot of junior consultants, fewer senior consultants and even fewer 
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managers and just a handful of principles and one or two partners in the top. And this 
organization you have to run as a pyramid. I thing that Thetas business is more traditional with 
line managers and the bosses boss and so on. So here it differs a little in culture. (Senior 
management consultant from Alpha) 
The system of practices in Alpha was an important fundament of the attractiveness 
of belonging to the organization and a support for enacting an elite identity, i.e. an 
image and self-understanding of being among the best and the chosen ones. This 
image was hence based on restrictive recruitment practices, a competitive career 
system, high consulting fees and salaries and the possibility for the consultants to 
live a “successfull” lifestyle. The identity and its supporting practices had a function 
for the management consultants as it was needed in order to be successful in for 
example convincing the clients of the competence and value of the consultants and 
their services. This included being able to fit in among CEOs and in corporate boards 
in the largest Swedish corporations. When a junior consultant from Alpha compared 
their group of consultants with the IT-consultants he reasoned as follow:  
People at Theta are everyday commoners that kind of just showed up. We (at Alpha) were a 
bunch of suite-people with well manicured nails, nice ties and so on. And then suddently a lot of 
IT-dudes showed up to come and sit here. There were huge differences in class. We had 
wonderful benefits. We had free breakfast each morning and the refrigerator was filled with sodas 
and free food to have if you work late and a lot of cakes and stuff. No wonder they wanted to have 
their share of that. (Junior management consultant from Alpha) 
The changes in practices and process thus implied changes in the professional 
identity for the management consultants which they did not find attractive in their 
professional role. First the changes meant a loss of opportunity to deliver high 
quality consulting services. For example, delegating sales activities to a sales unit 
didn’t fit the management consulting way of selling consulting services as it 
diminished the opportunity to interact and build relationships with central figures in 
the client firms. Second, the changes would mean a loss of status, both for the 
organization as a collective since the elite identity associated with their old practices 
would be weakened, and for the individuals since their belongingness, status, 
monetary benefits and career opportunities were threatened.  One senior consultant 
from Alpha described what he saws at stake as follows:  
Because these people (Alphas consultants) should in reality be those who are the best with the 
client, who can deliver the best and are “top-in-class. And if this works in a good and positive 
way in dialogue with the company those that are worst in class should be washed out from the 
system and do something else. Consequently those who do worst in our company should the 
entire time find something else to do so that the Darwinism can operate completely. When it 
doesn’t the company becomes average which means that the customer doesn’t want to pay as 
much. (Senior management consultant from Alpha) 
4. Outcome. Back to square one.  
The strategic change of the merger was not perceived as relevant by the management 
consultants since it didn´t seem to strengthen their professional role or bring them 
personal benefits. Rather it was perceived as a threat both to the status of the 
consultants and their ability to do a good job when interacting with the clients. As a 
consequence the Alpha-consultants avoided going through the sales unit and 
continued their relationship-based selling practices as usual. Additionally they 
avoided collaboration and interaction with the IT-consultants. The management 
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consultants subsequently rejected the new identity offer implied by the strategic and 
organizational changes by refusing to work according to the suggested practices and 
processes.   
In the long run Alphas rejection of the changed identity led to a reconceptualization 
of the merger. The ambitions to integrate were weakened at all levels of the 
organization. An initial step back was the abolishment of the common sales unit, 
which was followed by structural changes that separated the IT and management 
consulting operations into two largely autonomous operations. During the journey a 
large number of key professionals also chose to leave the firm, something which 
implied a great loss of value for the firm. 
Vignette Beta. The integration of a mid-size PSF into a larger group: new 
organization and failed professional identity conversion.  
Beta was founded in 1956 by a research assistant in acoustics at a leading technical 
university. As the first specialist consultancy in the area, the company soon became 
an authority and still has a strong reputation and close relation with several 
academic institutions. Beta currently employs about 130 employees in 12 offices  
1. Nature of strategic change. A takeover with a profit orientation 
The strategic changes for Beta started with the death of the founder in 1999 when the 
company was bought by a venture capitalist and later sold to a large public Swedish 
technical consulting firm. The management agenda following the acquisition was to 
increase business-mindedness, which meant less reliance on individual experts 
running their own projects and client relationships and more focus on a collective 
approach in which senior consultants were expected to do more of the selling and 
junior consultants more of the execution. Changes also implied an increased 
economic focus and follow-up in terms of individual sales and profitability. Focus 
gradually shifted from technical expertise, challenging projects and intellectual 
development, to economic margin and profitability. A group manager3 describes the 
challenge as follows:   
We are technical consultants within a narrow niche. People sometimes want to go deeper than 
what the client wants to pay for. That’s the reality. In that case many may think “the company 
should invest in this” but my question then is: How much money can we make on this in a 
reasonable time frame? I want to know that before committing any resources. People think that I 
am difficult, but sorry, if you want to do research you can do that at a university or in a research 
project, but not in a consulting project (Group manager) 
This strategic reorientation from a rather loosely managed firm, giving technical 
experts considerable freedom, to a more commercially oriented firm with more 
standardized processes and more detailed follow-up and control systems is the focus 
of this study.  
2. Changes in organizational practices and roles. From individual experts to 
commercially accountable consulting groups 
                                                 
3 Beta consultants were organized into work groups of 5-8 consultants responsible for their financial 
result. 
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Beta was initially organized in offices with cross-office competence groups structured 
around its major business (and competence) areas. While the geographical offices 
had the main economic responsibility, the role of the competence groups was the 
development and sharing of knowledge. There was no formal hierarchy among 
consultants and consultants viewed themselves as rather autonomous working with 
their “own” clients, which created a situation in which some consultants were 
overloaded with work, whereas others had problems filling their time sheets. 
Following the change in ownership, experimentation with the organizational 
structures and roles began.  
Based on the experience from “the profitable small offices” the CEO replacing the 
founder introduced a “resource group” organization, organizing consultants into 
groups of 5-10 consultants with mixed competencies. The main role of the group 
managers was to make sure the workload was evenly distributed within the group, 
which also meant deciding about who was to work on what projects with whom, 
something which had been up to the consultants that sold the project before. These 
groups were also given a profit and loss responsibility. In practice they become small 
companies of their own. This changed the roles of both group managers and 
consultants. Demands on especially the group managers increased as control and 
responsibility was concentrated to them. According to Beta’s quality system they 
were to check all client reports as well as the billing to clients to make sure it was 
commercially sound. For the consultants, this implied a strong emphasis on 
reporting time on client projects and an increasing focus on, and transparency of 
individual economic performance. By consultants this move was perceived to imply 
more structure and control. Consultants also noted a reorientation from a valuing of 
technical expertise to a valuing of “consulting skills” (i.e. to act profitably in the 
consulting role). 
3. Identity moves. From technical experts to profitable resources 
While the changes in organizational structures, procedures and roles following the 
changes in ownership may seem limited their implications for the consultants’ 
professional identities were far reaching. Consultants traditionally formulated their 
professional identities in relation to their expertise and identified with their peers in 
the competence groups. The competence group structure was appreciated by the 
consultants as it fit their expert identity. Part of this expert-based professional 
identity was also a strong expectation of autonomy to deliver the best solution to the 
client and consequently to choose how and with whom to do that. The external 
image of Beta as an authority in its field was well in line with this professional 
identity. 
The new structure and roles for consultants following from the more commercial 
focus of the owners challenged this existing professional identity. The emerging 
organizational structure, aimed at maximizing the utilization of consultants, was 
founded on a commercial logic rather than an expert logic and the consultants’ 
autonomy was curtailed based on a logic of more efficient use of resources. Critique 
against the reorganization and the decentralized profit and loss responsibility was 
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strong, mainly based on the argument that this created barriers between the groups 
that threatened the assignment of the “best people” to each project : 
Instead of increasing collaboration between the different offices, we now have 3 groups that no 
longer cooperate with each other because one of them received a bonus. It suddenly feels like the 
collaboration has stopped. We no longer have “the right person in the right place”. The jobs are 
kept in the groups until they just can’t handle them any more. (Experienced consultant) 
Consultants actively claimed to ignore the structure even though this could mean 
that they jeopardized the result of their group (and potentially a bonus for 
themselves): 
I have tried to avoid thinking about this [the group structure and its economic consequences]. I 
don’t think so much about the economic issues, I just try to do my best. (experienced consultant) 
The new more commercially oriented consultant role implied in the new structure 
also framed the consultant more as a team player and production factor in the 
company collective, being able to “fill their time sheets” and work with different 
individuals based on availability rather than their perceived competence. It also 
meant for more senior consultants to focus more on sales and delegating execution to 
more junior colleagues. This caused some resistance among consultants being used to 
strong autonomy:  
The group managers are responsible for the distribution of work, so they force people to work 
with others. In the beginning this was very sensitive. (Experienced support staff) 
Also a commercial approach to project planning and billing was perceived as a threat 
to the consultants’ professional identity and thus resisted. Projects had traditionally 
been driven by an expert logic delivering what the client needed (almost) regardless 
of financial implications. A refocusing on the commercial value of the delivery was 
hard to accept for many consultants:  
I try to change peoples’ mindset that it is not about how many hours you have spent but about 
what the job is worth. But the resistance against this has been strong. They can’t think along 
these lines, they find it horrible to think in this way. (Group manager) 
4. Outcomes.  Resistance, conflict and the loss of technical experts 
The years following the acquisition of Beta and the consequential reorganization and 
role changes have been described as a “nightmare” by the group managers. The 
transition has been characterized by dissatisfaction and frustration among 
employees. The more commercial identity offer was not well received by a lot of 
consultants. Many of the more experienced consultants left the organization due to 
dissatisfaction with the new organizational structure and roles. Consultants that 
were too far from the new identity offer were especially prone to leave:  
A lot of the consultants that liked working only on their own have quit. Those that are left are 
open and like working with a lot of people. (Experienced support staff) 
The experienced consultants that left were to a large extent replaced by young 
recruits with no or only little work experience. The current organization thus 
represents a different organization with a considerably less experienced work force 
than at the time of acquisition but with a more commercial awareness and focus. This 
workforce is provided with work by a few senior consultants with an extensive client 
network. This goes along with a standardization approach to recurrent tasks and a 
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stronger reliance on structural capital such as documentation from previous projects 
and methods and tools. The reorientation in the organization has also created a 
strong focus on the group managers as the focal point. As a consequence of the new 
organization and the resulting composition of the workforce, the group managers 
perceive a passivization among consultants acting out a professional identity as 
organizational resources. They play their role in the organizational machine but are 
unwilling/unable to take a broader responsibility.  
After a turbulent time the organization has now stabilized and consultants are 
optimistic of a bright future. However, the identity shift has set deep marks in the 
organization and seems to have required the replacement of large parts of the 
experienced consultants by younger and less experienced ones. The longer-term 
consequences on competencies and career development are still pending issues. 
Vignette Gamma. A mid-size PSF’s re-organization: long and difficult 
collective evolution of organizational practices, roles and identities 
Gamma is a French PSF which provides economic expertise and consulting services 
to French and European works’ councils. Founded in 1971, the PSF reached 400 
members (350 consultants) in 2008. From its foundation, a distinctive feature has 
been the “self-management” project which is associated with a rejection of hierarchy 
and a democratic functioning (election of local and corporate managers, collective 
decisions through votes, etc.). Gamma is composed of 17 very independent business 
units in which professionals act autonomously after a period of apprenticeship of ca. 
3 years. This autonomy is both a client-relation autonomy and a cognitive autonomy, 
in which professionals rely on their own resources (personal knowledge and 
informal networks). Adding that the pay system rests upon a “earn-what-you-bill” 
principle, the overall organization was consistent as long as management issues were 
limited to rather simple tasks (mainly the fair assignment of clients to consultants 
and recruitment). The professional identity offered by the organization was a mix of 
autonomy and expertise associated with social engagement and attachment to the 
democratic functioning.  
1. Nature of strategic change. A dramatic complexification and diversification of 
professional services.  
One condition for the autonomous organization was that client demands were 
relatively stable and did not exceed individual cognitive capabilities But the 
environment changed from the mid-1990s. First, clients' demands complexified and 
required a focus on prospective analyses (eg. Which risk of lay-offs in the coming 
years?) and sometimes new kinds of analyses (eg. the impact of sustainable 
development policies for the future of a chemistry plant). The evolution was 
accompanied by an increase in competition on Gamma's market. Consequently, the 
quality of services delivered became increasingly important  to differentiate from 
competitors. Last, the service portfolio extended to provide services to European 
works' councils and socio-economic surveys to the European Commission and to 
European trade-union actors.   
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The need to move towards renewed and extended professional services shed light on 
the limits of the existing organisation and practices. The traditional “intellectual 
craftship”, based on personal and informal resources, was no longer sufficient to face 
the strategic issues due to individual cognitive limitations (numerous knowledge 
fields to master in a short time).  
2. Changes in organisational processes and roles. Organising knowledge 
management and designing new roles for experts and managers 
Gamma was originally organised in autonomous offices with very few structured 
cross-office devices. Inside each office, the situation was similar with no cooperative 
devices of knowledge management4. The main evolution in the organization of 
Gamma has been the development of structures dedicated to knowledge 
management (“knowledge-field” structures) at different levels of the organisation: at 
the group level when relevant (eg. around the steel industry) or at the cross-office 
level on sectors or management themes (for instance HRM, sustainable development, 
downsizing and reorganizations). 
While this organization may appear obvious at first glance, the implementation and 
the micro-design of the organization and its roles were highly conflictual and 
challenging. Two kinds of issues represented the main concerns of affected 
professionals: a first one was around the possible loss of professional autonomy if 
new structures and more control was implemented; a second one was about the 
democratic functioning of these new structures (an associated risk of loss of 
democratic control was feared by some consultants, due to the strategic resource 
represented by expertise mastering). On the whole, the issue was to design an 
organisation both functionally efficient and democratically anchored.  
The functional part had to rely on a clarified vision of the objectives of the 
knowledge-field structures. Three functions were identified as a basis for efficient 
functioning: expertise development (the basis of such structures), commercial 
development (to value and drive expertise development towards clients' needs) and 
knowledge management (dedicated to internal knowledge sharing, training and 
support on assignments). A fourth prerequisite was that management was dedicated 
to make the structure work (strategy, coordination, administrative work, etc.) and to  
limit   the effects of the “clients first” orientation common in PSFs (Maister, 1993).  
Embodying these structures required the design of expert roles and role innovation 
relative to the management of such knowledge-field groups. The new structure 
offered new expert roles to consultants with specialist profiles.  
The implementation of the new organization required a reallocation of resources and 
support in order to create and legitimate the new roles in the evolving organisation. 
Making these changes was, however, challenging in the professional and democratic 
context of Gamma. First it posed an efficiency challenge: experts needed time and 
                                                 
4 Knowledge management is here used in a general meaning and not restricted to a tool 
approach of KM.  
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resources to develop expertise and to manage the back-office structure. Consequently 
the company had to develop an investment policy to sustain such developments.  
Second, the democratic legitimacy of the changes was disputed since they could lead 
to the “ownership” of knowledge which was a strategic resource in Gamma. There 
was a legitimacy to construct through the inscription of the structure and roles in an 
overall strategy so that it proofs its value for the collective.  
These changes went along with the strengthening of the role of elected managers in 
the business units since they had to provide a strategic vision to orientate and 
legitimate the investments made in the new knowledge structure. Managers were 
also given responsibility for yearly interviews with consultants, a new management 
device aimed at orientating assignments and roles in the organisation. These 
interviews were an important facilitator of the transaction between strategy, 
processes and individuals They particularly offered a management lever to 
differentiate between consultants’ careers and profiles, which had been impossible in 
the old structure. Moreover, the interviews enacted an evolution of the meaning of 
“democracy” from strict egalitarianism to a more collective purpose and 
organisation.  
3. Identity moves. Legitimate differentiation and new career paths. 
These designed evolutions produced both positive and negative reactions among 
consultants. A first category of consultants feared the loss of autonomy. That a 
consultant on an assignment would ask for support from an “expert” in a 
knowledge-field was in a sense contradictory to the valued equality of peers in a 
democratic PSF. But this identity move was facilitated as it went along with 
“knowledge-field” group's contribution to upgrading the delivered services. On the 
whole, the need for a coordinated organisation is no longer contested.  
The creation of expert roles has been of importance for the dynamics of the 
organisation. Before, careers only developed along one way, namely elected 
management roles. Even if informal recognition existed in Gamma, the organisation 
did not foster the recognition of professional identities based on specialisation in an 
expertise domain. The new organisation clarified the contribution of experts to the 
firm and provided new perspectives for such expert profiles. Next to more 
management and relational professional identities, expertise in a domain is 
recognised and a source of self-enhancement.  
In the same vein, the management of knowledge-fields provided new roles for 
experienced consultants. However, these roles were not completely “framed” and are 
still not, due to the nature of the domain and its integration with the overall business. 
Role innovation put experienced professionals under pressure since developing in 
knowledge-field carries uncertainties and possibly contestation. Several experience 
consultants endured conflicts in legitimating new ways of cooperation. This 
sometimes led either to marginalisations or to departures.  
The organizational changes implemented have also led to major changes for the 
elected business unit managers, which now have an important place in the 
organisation. Their identity has been strengthened through the organisational 
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evolution. Group manager is now an almost full-time role with important 
responsibilities in strategy formation and human resource management. This 
transition was challenging since both the professional and his\her colleagues needed 
to accept the evolution. On the whole, the transition was less contested than with 
expert roles since the management roles are more easily anchored in traditional 
devices (vote and delegation).  
The identity moves, while not easy, have been facilitated by the evolutionary (rather 
than revolutionary) process which respects the prevailing professional identities and 
considers strategic change as a mutual transaction between the organization and the 
professionals.  
4. Outcomes. A long process of co-expanding organisational abilities and 
professionals' perspectives. 
The overall process started more than 10 years ago with the researchers working on 
the last three years. In april 2008, the need for evolution was no longer contested, 
even if the means could be and some fears still existed.  
Concerning the organisation, the new device of yearly interviews is stabilised and 
fosters career development in a transaction perspective between Gamma and each 
professional. The knowledge-field structures have different degrees of vitality and 
maturity, depending on several factors: age, centrality in the business but also means 
and organisational support 
The main remaining constraint is currently the pay-system which does not spur 
people to collaborate in cross-activities. Future developments thus problably need to 
ensure an adaption of the remunerations system with the objectives of the 
organisation.  
At the individual level, the offered possibility to distinguish between different roles 
and professional identities has been a relief for experienced professionals who felt 
being marginalised or without career perspectives.  
5. Discussion.  
While the three cases differ in the origin of the strategic change and its outcomes, 
reading them with the four-level analytical framework reveals some common 
dynamics that will be discussed in the following. First, we elaborate on the 
intertwined nature of the organizational and role changes and the related identity 
moves and how these shape outcomes. Second, we turn to the process by which new 
organizational structures and roles and professional identities become (or fail to 
become) aligned. Finally, we discuss the role of professional identities as insurance 
against misdirected change initiatives.    
An intertwined process of co-evolution between organisational 
processes and roles with professional identities 
The three cases suggest that the outcome of strategic change (in PSFs for our concern 
here) is an uncertain process with both intended and unintended consequences, with 
the unintended consequences potentially overshadowing the intended ones. Based 
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on the cases, we suggest that the main nexus of the strategic change and its 
(unintended) outcomes lies in the intimate, but to be considered separate, links 
between the concretisation of strategic changes in new roles and processes and the 
acceptability to the professionals of the demands or offer of evolving professional 
identities that these changes make to organisational members. The analytical 
framework allows to distinguish between a functional aspect of the change, close to 
organisational design (second step of the analytic scheme), and a concrete 
functioning with professionals working on their identity to evolve with the new 
organisation (third step). While identity moves in PSFs have so far mainly been 
considered in a given organisational setting (eg. Ibarra, 1999; Pratt et al, 2006), 
strategic change can act as an upheaval for professional identities with dramatic 
consequences for both professionals and PSFs as the cases illustrate. The dynamics of 
changing organizational roles, identity work and consequences differed somewhat 
between the cases.  
In Alpha, the consequences of the strategic change are embodied in the departure of 
many consultants and the way back to pre-merger organisational practices. These 
consequences may be seen as the result of a failed identity transaction between the 
management consultants in Alpha and the new organization and roles aiming at a 
complete integration of IT- and management consultants. Based on our framework 
we may argue that the motive of the strategic change may not have been  wrong in 
itself. Rather, the implementation strategy was problematic, based on an insufficient 
understanding of the link between the emerging organization and the consultants’ 
professional identities. The organisational development, with less attractive careers 
for Alpha consultants, more constraints on consultants and forced common sales, did 
not take into account the specifics of the alpha consultants’ business activities and 
consequential professional identities. The role separation between sales and 
assignments may be argued to have been a functional mistake that threatened the 
consultants’ professional identities i.e. their understanding of how a good consultant 
would act. As a consequences many consultants reacted by leaving the firm for 
competitors or spin-offs. Alpha consultants’ professional identities encompassed a 
distinctive elite professional identity (Alvesson and Robertson, 2006; Schilling, 2008) 
associated with a manner of doing business in close relation to top management’s 
clients which had proven its relevance in Alpha as well as in other PSFs. In the Alpha 
case, the constraints imposed on roles and identity evolutions were such that there 
were few possibilities for “identity work” (Kreiner et al, 2006) in which professionals 
could bring their professional identities and organizational structures and roles in 
line.   
In Beta, the process of conversion following the acquisition is forced without taking 
into account the tradition of expertise among experienced consultants. Moving the 
business model from “exploration” to “exploitation” (March, 1991), the new CEO did 
not consider the consequences that such a rupture may cause for the consultants 
enacting an expert-oriented professional identity. The situation before the takeover 
was troubled with falling profitability and Beta had to make its organisation evolve. 
However, changing an organisation based on expert roles, with people mainly 
motivated by the content of work, to a classic consulting organisation with a 
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hierarchical and efficiency driven division of work generated a massive departure of 
experienced consultants. The identity offer following the acquisition to consultants 
was not compatible with existing and well-anchored professional identities focused 
on expertise valuation. As the identity offer took the form of a “conversion” with no 
room for transaction and possible adaptation between professionals and the intended 
strategy of the new general management, many professionals had no choice but to 
leave if they did not want to adapt to the commercial-oriented new roles.  
The unwillingness to adapt to the new roles may also (at least for some consultants) 
be interpreted as an inability to adapt due to cognitive limitations, as the new roles 
required partly new “consulting skills”, which included a more commercial 
orientation and a strong ability to relate to clients. It might be argued, that the 
consultants that embraced the new roles and identities (e.g. the group managers) 
while good technically excelled in their capacity of management and client relations . 
The consequences of the strategic move became the replacement of a large part of the 
personnel, with a massive recruitment of juniors in a standardisation  business logic. 
However, the future remains uncertain as the capacity to innovate has been reduced 
by the numerous resignments.  
In Gamma, the strategic change is emerging more gradually because of its internal 
nature and the gradually evolving client demands, the meaning of which is not 
crystal-clear at first. Different initiatives developed over time, well before the 
collaborative research started in 2005. The evolution has been all but linear and un-
contested. However, the new structures and roles have not denied the prevailing 
professional identities. This is partly due to the fact that experienced consultants 
were strongly involved in new developments (eg. Sustainable development, 
downsizing). The democratic functioning also constrained the evolution as a majority 
of people rejected a conversion to classical management consulting models based on 
a fear of expertise privatisation. Knowledge-fields groups thus evolved in response 
to both  efficiency and democratic demands. The roles and their inscription in 
renewed organisational processes have been progressively elaborated with taking 
into account these conditions. These conditions were both constraints (eg. The 
democratic control of knowledge-field’s experts) and enablers, since the overall 
absence of conflicts around the consultants’ professional identity enabled 
experimentation and evolution of the organisation. The time of conversion is also an 
important factor. It has taken more than 10 years of progressive and disputed change 
to reach a rather uncontested situation. This time has been a period of mutual 
learning and experimentation necessary for the organisational evolution but also for 
the conversion of the professional identities from the autonomous “craftmen” 
professionals to more coordinated and collective work patterns. 
The three cases suggest that relations between dramatic organisational changes and 
professional identities are recursive and mutually dependant. Unless a wave of 
departures is integrated in the new processes, it is always a great loss for a PSF to 
lose high-standard professionals. Strategic changes should thus be considered in a 
long run to occur in conditions which allow sufficient adaptation. This adaptation 
relates both to the professionals in their new roles and to the structures, roles and 
processes which are designed to implement the strategic change. This is also justified 
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by efficiency reasons due to the uncertainties caused by such major changes. 
Consequently, relations between the evolution of processes and roles and the 
professionals’ identity moves should not be considered one-way only. Rather, 
prerequisites for an identity transaction in which an alignment between 
organizational structures and procedures and professional identities can emerge 
need to be created.  
The specific process of identity evolution in role innovation 
Uncertainties regarding outcomes are more than ever present when “role 
innovation” is required. This is the case for consultants in Alpha working in the 
common sales-unit with IT-consultants, for the group managers in Beta, with 
managerial and unfamiliar commercial tasks, and for Gamma’s expert roles and 
managers in knowledge-fields. The evolution has to be cautious because the 
professionals move to relatively unknown areas, relating to their expertise or skills 
and organisational and colleagues’ reactions.  
In role innovation situations, two opposite phenomena may impede positive change 
outcomes. First, when roles and identities are too precisely prescribed to 
professionals, not leaving any  space for identity work and development, it usually 
leads to departures or resisting professionals. This was for example the case in Beta 
where experienced consultants were forced to convert to new, more commercially 
oriented and evaluated roles with no place for evolving more smoothly towards the 
new functioning and more commercially oriented professional identities. Also in 
Alpha the mismatch between organizational structures and roles (e.g. the joint sales 
unit) and professionals’ identities and the lack of processes of matching the two led 
to resistance and resignations.  
This phenomenon is somewhat predictable, since professional resistance has been 
studied for a long time and has been shown to have a strong source of power based 
on manpower volatility, scarcity and the defence of its turf (Mintzberg, 1989; Maister, 
1993; Montana, 1968). But the reverse relation exists as well: when the design of 
innovative roles is delegated to professionals without considering organizational 
resources, cognitive aspects and recognition issues, it may lead to failure with 
professionals’ departures or at least resitance and frustration. Once again, strategic 
change is not just an issue of willingness but one of finding a pattern of evolution 
sustainable for both the PSF and the individuals. For example in Gamma, several 
experts engaged in role innovation since they had ideas and a more or less strong 
managerial approval. The most important is not the degree of approval but the 
resources which are available for professionals to experiment. In these situations of 
role innovations for professionals, different analyses during the collaborative 
research revealed situations of identity threats due to internal resistance and risks of 
failure. Such difficulties may lead to the departure of experienced consultants. Role 
innovation must thus be supported by the organisation (Anand et al, 2007) (with 
time, human and financial resources, with integration in a collective strategic plan) in 
order to enable positive identity work. The experimentation with new roles is subject 
to recurrent revision and evolution according to the business perspectives and first 
results. Such cautious evolution for the individuals, sources of resistance and tension 
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(Heusinkveld & Benders, 2005) might also be relevant in considering evolving 
services and innovations in PSFs. Learning loops are necessary to better design and 
adjust the organisation processes to actual functioning, including resistance. Once 
again, relations between organisational processes and roles and identity moves are 
mutually influencing in an intertwined process.  
Professional identities: relevance beyond resistance, resource rather than 
burden 
Professional identities should not be considered just in a resistance perspective to 
change. Professional identities have been considered in power interpretations as a 
control variable on professionals (eg. Alvesson, 2000) or as a means for professionals 
to preserve their autonomy in PSFs (eg. McInnes et al., 2006). While not contesting 
such effects and roles played by professional identities during periods of strategic 
change we argue that a complementary effect should be considered and might 
facilitate the compulsory transactions and mutual adjustments of roles and identities. 
What is interpreted as resistance may well represent a signal of relevance regarding 
changes at the strategic and organisational levels. In other words, professional 
identities may carry a kind of cognitive relevance when it comes to strategic changes. 
All the three cases illustrate the fact that the resistance of professionals can also be 
interpreted as a resource, and not only a burden that management has to tackle. In 
that perspective, the reactions in Alpha can be intepreted as legitimate resistance to a 
functional error in designing new processes and roles. Professional identities operate 
as a resource in detecting and signaling major mis-orientations. In Beta, the 
professional identities’ expert orientations were a signal of strength vis á vis 
competitors. This is not a denial of the need for Beta to change, but the 
acknowledgment that such a rupture did not leave room for learning loops between 
management and professionals to find compromises and fine-tune the 
implementation. In each case, most professionals who resisted had no choice but 
leaving for competitors. Gamma went through tough arguments about the future of 
the firm, and consultants were divided into two groups – one that wanted to convert 
to a traditional PSF form and one that wanted to stick to the original model. 
Eventually, this tension develop innovations in order to find a compromise that 
answered to both fears of democratic loss and of competitive decline. This allowed to 
find new solutions.  
Due to the specific knowledge that professionals possess about expertise, activities 
and clients, a strong integration of them in the design of strategic change makes 
sense (Chreim, 2007). It may foster a dynamic of progressive adaptation and revision 
according to learning loops in which professionals contribute.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of the current paper has been to contribute to the understanding and the 
analysis of strategic change from within the PSF. We argue that the role of 
professional identities, while acknowledged as a key dimension of control and 
professionals’ individual dynamics, has been under-utilized in understanding 
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strategic change in PSFs. An analytical framework is proposed to this aim. It 
articulates four steps of systematic analysis, namely:  
1. The nature of the strategic change; 
2. The changes in organisational processes and in related roles; 
3. The actual identity moves by the professionals;  
4. The outcomes of the strategic change process.  
This framework offers a generic pattern of analysis to grasp the nature of strategic 
changes affecting organisational processes in a diversity of PSFs. Next to the 
contribution of Chreim et al (2007) on interlevel influences on professional identities 
(namely individual, organisation and institutional), the four-level framework is 
another contribution to the emerging research field of professional identities and 
strategic change in PSFs. We develop the framework through the analysis of three 
cases to demonstrate that the concretisation of strategic change passes through an 
intertwined and reciprocal dynamic of the evolution of organisational processes and 
roles and the transformation of professional identities. The different cases suggest 
that pure top-down approaches with too little room for adaptation of professional 
identities inevitably led to massive departures of professionals. In an industry where 
competitive advantage is based on the capacity to attract and retain professionals, 
PSFs should be cautious with such consequences, which were unintended in two of 
the cases. The flight of professionals however is not the only reason for integrating 
them in a progressive process of organisational change. Another argument lies in the 
relevance of professional identities as a protective mechanism against structures and 
roles that may endanger the professional setting. The suggested approach, however,  
does not plead for a large delegated autonomy to professionals. Especially in role 
innovation, where professional identities are at stake with large uncertainties for the 
outcome, management support and direction are essential. These situations require 
close interaction with and among professionals developing these roles as they have 
vulnerable professional identities, limited legitimacy and recognition and are often 
contested.  
This paper has pursued an exploratory approach and opens up several areas of 
further research. A first direction is to continue to test the analytical framework on 
other situations of strategic change. We have here only considered strategic changes 
with organisational implications. It would be interesting to study strategic changes 
which at first glance could be only value changes. A hypothesis would be that no 
strategic change goes without organisation evolutions, as Cooper et al (1996) argued 
with the use of archetypes to describe moves from a “P” form to “Managed 
Professional Businesses”. But while showing strategic change as a “layer” of novelty 
pushing away or accommodating to a former archetype, we could explore in a micro- 
and meso-perspective such moves as a mutual deformation and innovation processes 
integrating both former processes and identities with intended evolutions. This 
approach would be coherent with traditional approaches to professional identity in 
which it is considered a dynamic equilibrium between continuity and novelty (eg. 
Ibarra, 1999; Kreiner et al, 2006).  
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